Scott v. Little

Not specified
Decided District Court, S. D. New York
Disposition
denied
full scope · unanimous
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Court
District Court, S. D. New York
Decided
Judge
BROWN, District Judge
Posture
Motion for injunction pending in District Court
Plaintiff/Complainant (new assignee in bankruptcy of James Boyle) (1)
William F. Scott
William Ford Upson, Wager Swayne
v.
Defendant (grantee and mortgagee) (1)
Andrew Little
Abner O. Thomas
Other parties: Eleventh Ward Bank — Defendant (mortgagee), Henry Steers — Defendant (mortgagee), James Boyle — Bankrupt (deceased grantor), John Nikia — Original assignee in bankruptcy (deceased)

Overview

The motion for an injunction is denied. The action is barred by the two-year limitation of Section 5057, and there is no evidence of renunciation of title by the defendant Little before the bankruptcy.

Case summary

This case involves a suit by William F. Scott, the new assignee in bankruptcy of James Boyle, to set aside a 1873 deed from Boyle to his son-in-law Andrew Little as a cloud on the bankruptcy estate's title. The deed was executed and recorded in 1873, but Little did not see it until 1878, shortly before Boyle's bankruptcy, when he objected to a clause requiring him to assume mortgages. Little left the deed with a lawyer for correction, but it was lost. The original assignee learned all facts by 1879 but took no action for over two years. Scott filed suit in 1896. The District Court denied a motion for injunction, holding that the action was barred by the two-year limitation in Section 5057 of the Revised Statutes, as the assignee knew the facts more than two years before suing. The court also found no evidence that Little renounced title before bankruptcy, as his objection was to a specific clause, not the transfer itself. Additionally, the court noted that equity jurisdiction was improper because Scott was out of possession and should have brought an ejectment action.

Abstract

The bankruptcy assignee sought to set aside a prior deed as a cloud on the estate's title, but the deed transferee had objected only to a mortgage assumption clause without renouncing the transfer itself. The court held the action barred by the two-year limitation period, as the original assignee knew the facts more than two years before suit was filed. Equity jurisdiction was also improper since the plaintiff was out of possession and should have pursued ejectment instead.

Opinion of the court

Majority
opinion
BROWN, District Judge
  • Section 5057 bars actions not brought within two years of assignee's knowledge of facts
  • No renunciation of title by Little; objection to clause does not equal rejection of title
  • Equity bill to remove cloud on title not available to person out of possession

Jurisdiction

not challenged
Subject matter
Federal bankruptcy law under the Revised Statutes
Jurisdictional facts
  • Case involves interpretation of Section 5057 of the Revised Statutes (bankruptcy limitation period)
  • Suit to set aside a deed as a cloud on title in bankruptcy context

Procedural posture

Posture at trial
Motion for injunction pending in District Court
Posture on appeal
Not an appeal; original proceeding on motion for injunction
Preserved issues
  • Whether action is barred by two-year limitation under Section 5057
  • Whether grantee renounced title before bankruptcy

Legal categories

BusinessEstate Planning and Real Estate

Case record

Full case name
SCOTT v. LITTLE et al.
Docket number
Not specified
Court
District Court, S. D. New York
Trial court
District Court, S. D. New York
Trial court judge
BROWN, District Judge
Decided
Opinion author
BROWN, District Judge
Opinion type
published
Precedential status
precedential
Judges on panel
BROWN, District Judge

Issues & holdings

2
Issues raised
2
affirmed
3
Holdings
Standard of review

de novo (statutory interpretation)

Disposition rationale

Action barred because assignee knew facts more than two years before suit

Preservation

Issue preserved for review

Standard of review

clearly erroneous (factual finding)

Disposition rationale

No sufficient evidence of renunciation; Little's objection was to a clause, not the title

Preservation

Issue preserved for review

Holdings of the court

Limitation under Section 5057
The action is barred by the two-year limitation in Section 5057 of the Revised Statutes
Assignee knew all facts by 1879 but took no action for over two years; Supreme Court precedents require contest within two years of knowledge
unanimousbinding precedent
Renunciation of title
There was no sufficient evidence that Little renounced title before bankruptcy
Little's objection to an assumption clause in the deed did not constitute rejection of the title; assent to transfer presumed from circumstances
unanimousbinding precedent
Equity jurisdiction
A person out of possession cannot maintain a bill in equity to remove a cloud on title
Must resort to ejectment action; cited Frost v. Spitley
unanimousbinding precedent

Error analysis

  • Failure to apply Section 5057 limitation period — procedural · no error foundNot applicable · not applicable
  • Incorrect finding on renunciation of title — evidentiary · no error foundNot applicable · not applicable

Statutory interpretation

1
Statute
Section 5057 of the Revised Statutes
Question
Whether two-year limitation applies to claims first asserted after bankruptcy
Court's reading
Limitation applies if assignee knew facts; action must be contested within two years of knowledge
Canons applied
Plain meaningPrecedent-based interpretation

Burden of proof

Prosecution burden
Complainant must prove deed is void and action not barred
Burden met
false

Standards of review

  • Interpretation of Section 5057 limitation — de novo Statutory interpretation reviewed de novo
  • Factual finding on renunciation of title — clearly erroneous Trial court's factual findings reviewed for clear error

Timeline

7
Events
8,400
Days, incident to ruling
—
Span
factual eventcited in opinion

James Boyle executed and recorded a deed to Andrew Little for two lots on Mangin street

Created the property transfer at issue

Whether title vested in LittleWhether deed was a cloud on title
James Boyle · Andrew Little Mangin street
factual eventcited in opinion

Little received the deed, objected to an assumption clause requiring him to pay mortgages, and left it with lawyer for correction

Key to determining whether Little renounced title

Renunciation of titleAcceptance of deed
Andrew Little · Lawyer
procedural eventcited in opinion

James Boyle adjudicated a bankrupt

Triggered bankruptcy proceedings and assignee's rights

Application of Section 5057 limitation
James Boyle bankruptcy court
procedural eventcited in opinion

Assignment of Boyle's property to John Nikia as assignee in bankruptcy

Assignee gained authority to challenge deeds

Limitation period under Section 5057
John Nikia bankruptcy court
procedural eventcited in opinion

Examination of Boyle and Little revealed all important facts; assignee Nikia learned of them

Knowledge of facts started two-year limitation period under Section 5057

Limitation bar
John Nikia · James Boyle · Andrew Little bankruptcy court
filingcited in opinion

New assignee William F. Scott filed suit for injunction to set aside 1873 deed as cloud on title

Outcome: Motion for injunction denied

Initiated the current proceeding

Limitation under Section 5057Equity jurisdiction
William F. Scott trial court
rulingcited in opinion

District Court denied motion for injunction, holding action barred by Section 5057 and no renunciation of title by Little

Outcome: Injunction denied

Final disposition of the motion

All issues
BROWN, District Judge trial court

Facts & evidence

Incident

Date
Location
Mangin street (property location)

Key facts

9 facts
  1. James Boyle (bankrupt) executed and recorded a deed to Andrew Little (son-in-law) on November 1, 1873
  2. Boyle was indebted to Little for loans
  3. Little did not see the deed until 1878, shortly before Boyle's bankruptcy
  4. Deed contained an objectionable clause requiring Little to assume existing mortgages
  5. Little objected to the clause and left deed with lawyer for correction, but deed was lost after lawyer's death
  6. Boyle adjudicated bankrupt on April 29, 1878
  7. Assignee John Nikia appointed July 13, 1878, learned all facts by 1879 but took no action for over two years
  8. Nikia died; Scott appointed new assignee and filed suit in 1896 to set aside deed as cloud on title
  9. Little and his assigns had been in possession for many years

Disputed questions

  • Whether Little renounced or rejected title before bankruptcy
  • Whether Little's actions constituted acceptance or rejection of the deed

Procedural history

4 steps
  1. 1873: Deed executed and recorded
  2. 1878: Bankruptcy adjudication; Little saw deed and objected to clause
  3. 1879: Assignee learned all facts
  4. 1896: New assignee Scott filed suit for injunction

Evidence in the record

Testimonial
  • Examination of bankrupt James Boyle in 1879
  • Examination of defendant Andrew Little in 1879
Documentary
  • Deed from James Boyle to Andrew Little dated November 1, 1873
  • Records of bankruptcy proceedings
  • Record of state court suit
Challenged
  • Evidence type: Deed of 1873 · Challenge basis: Alleged void for want of delivery and acceptance, and cloud on title · Trial court ruling: admitted · Reasoning: Court considered it but found no renunciation and action barred · Challenged on appeal: false · Appellate outcome: not applicable

Objects of relevance

Deed from James Boyle to Andrew Little dated November 1, 1873

Policy considerations

  • Finality in bankruptcy proceedings
  • Protection of bona fide purchasers after limitations expire

Authorities

Cited authorities (7)

Jenkins v. Bank, 106 U. S. 571, 2 Sup. Ct. 1
followedprecedent
Cited for principle that claims must be contested within two years of knowledge under Section 5057
Avery v. Cleary, 132 U. S. 604, 10 Sup. Ct. 220
followedprecedent
Cited for limitation principle under Section 5057
Glenny v. Langdon, 98 U. S. 20
followedprecedent
Cited for bar extending to creditors after assignee's time expires under Section 5057
Trimble v. Woodhead, 102 U. S. 647
followedprecedent
Cited for bar under Section 5057
Moyer v. Dewey, 103 U. S. 301
followedprecedent
Cited for bar under Section 5057
Pearsall v. Smith, 149 U. S. 231, 13 Sup. Ct. 833
followedprecedent
Cited for bar under Section 5057
Frost v. Spitley, 121 U. S. 552-556, 7 Sup. Ct. 1129
followedprecedent
Cited for rule that person out of possession cannot maintain equity bill to remove cloud on title

Related cases (7)

Jenkins v. Bank, 106 U. S. 571, 2 Sup. Ct. 1
prior appeal
Cited for limitation principle under Section 5057
Avery v. Cleary, 132 U. S. 604, 10 Sup. Ct. 220
prior appeal
Cited for limitation principle under Section 5057
Glenny v. Langdon, 98 U. S. 20
prior appeal
Cited for bar extending to creditors after assignee's time expires
Trimble v. Woodhead, 102 U. S. 647
prior appeal
Cited for bar under Section 5057
Moyer v. Dewey, 103 U. S. 301
prior appeal
Cited for bar under Section 5057
Pearsall v. Smith, 149 U. S. 231, 13 Sup. Ct. 833
prior appeal
Cited for bar under Section 5057
Frost v. Spitley, 121 U. S. 552-556, 7 Sup. Ct. 1129
prior appeal
Cited for rule that person out of possession cannot maintain equity bill to remove cloud on title

Statutes

  • Section 5057 of the Revised Statutes (bankruptcy limitation)

Standards & doctrines

  • Two-year limitation doctrine under Section 5057
  • Equity jurisdiction doctrine from Frost v. Spitley

Legal principles applied

  • Two-year limitation period for bankruptcy claims under Section 5057
  • Person out of possession must use ejectment, not equity, to remove cloud on title

Notable quotes

“I do not find in these facts any such renunciation of title to the premises by Little as the complainant alleges.”
majority — Discussing Little's objection to the assumption clause in the deed
Key factual finding that Little did not reject title
“Taking the facts altogether, it seems to me necessary under the construction given by the Supreme Court to section 5057, to hold a case like the present governed by that provision.”
majority — Conclusion on limitation issue
Application of Supreme Court precedent to bar the action
Index terms58
Summary terms
Legal mechanisms
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Various actors
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Legal procedures
Legal remedies
Legal evidence
Legal arguments
Legal defenses
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Geo locations
Judges
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Procedural terms
Entities and documentation
Legal actions
Action type
denied
Target
motion for injunction
Appealed from
District Court
Context
Court denied the motion for injunction, holding action barred by Section 5057 and no renunciation of title
Scope
full
Disposition vote
unanimous
Search facets
Parties
Judges
Brown
Courts
Locations
Statutes cited