Raymond v. Royal Baking-Powder Co.

No. 337
Decided Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
Disposition
dismissed
full scope · unanimous
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Court
Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois
Decided
Judge
JENKINS, Circuit Judge
Posture
Decree entered after final hearing on merits, granting injunction and referring matter to master for accounting
Defendant (1)
George E. Raymond
Frederick A. Smith, Frank A. Ilelmer
v.
Plaintiff (1)
Royal Baking-Powder Company
Rowland Cox, Jacob R. Custer

Overview

The appeal is dismissed.

Case summary

The Royal Baking-Powder Company sued George E. Raymond for trademark infringement, seeking to prevent his use of the word 'Royal' for baking powder. After a hearing on the merits, the circuit court entered a decree on January 21, 1896, finding infringement, granting a perpetual injunction, and referring the case to a master for an accounting of profits. Raymond appealed on June 17, 1896. The Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely, holding that the January 21 decree was interlocutory (not final) because it referred the matter to a master for a judicial purpose (accounting). Under the applicable statute, appeals from interlocutory decrees granting injunctions must be taken within 30 days, which Raymond failed to do. The court did not reach the merits of the trademark infringement claim.

Abstract

Plaintiff sued defendant for trademark infringement by using the word "Royal" on baking powder, resulting in a circuit court decree finding infringement, issuing a perpetual injunction, and referring profits accounting to a master. Defendant's appeal was dismissed by the Circuit Court of Appeals as untimely because the decree was deemed interlocutory, requiring a 30-day appeal period for injunctions that was not met. The merits of the infringement claim were not addressed.

Opinion of the court

Majority
opinion
JENKINS, Circuit Judgejoined by WOODS
  • Decree was interlocutory because it referred case to master for judicial accounting
  • Appeal from interlocutory decree must be taken within 30 days
  • Appeal was untimely and must be dismissed

Jurisdiction

challenged
Statutory basis
Section 7 of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 826, c. 517), as amended by the act of February 18, 1895 (28 Stat. 666, c. 96)
Subject matter
Appeal from interlocutory decree granting injunction in equity suit
Jurisdictional holding
Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because appeal from interlocutory decree was not taken within 30 days as required by statute
Jurisdictional facts
  • Appeal taken from decree entered January 21, 1896
  • Appeal perfected June 17, 1896

Procedural posture

Posture at trial
Decree entered after final hearing on merits, granting injunction and referring matter to master for accounting
Posture on appeal
Appeal from interlocutory decree
Preserved issues
  • Timeliness of appeal from interlocutory decree
Forfeited issues
  • Merits of trademark infringement claim

Legal categories

Business

Case record

Full case name
RAYMOND v. ROYAL BAKING-POWDER CO.
Docket number
No. 337
Court
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
Trial court
Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois
Decided
Opinion author
JENKINS, Circuit Judge
Opinion type
published
Precedential status
precedential
Judges on panel
WOODSJENKINS

Issues & holdings

1
Issues raised
1
affirmed
2
Holdings
Standard of review

de novo

Disposition rationale

The decree was interlocutory because it referred the case to a master for judicial purpose (accounting), and appeal from interlocutory decree must be taken within 30 days

Preservation

Issue preserved for review

Holdings of the court

Nature of the January 21, 1896 decree
The decree was interlocutory, not final
A final decree is one where nothing remains to be done by the court except to execute it ministerially. This decree referred the case to a master for a judicial purpose (accounting), upon which a further decree would be entered, making it interlocutory.
unanimousbinding precedent
Timeliness of appeal
The appeal was untimely and must be dismissed
Under Section 7 of the judiciary act, appeals from interlocutory decrees granting injunctions must be taken within 30 days. This appeal was perfected on June 17, 1896, more than 30 days after the January 21, 1896 decree.
unanimousbinding precedent

Error analysis

  • Appellant appealed from interlocutory decree more than 30 days after entry — procedural · error foundNot applicable - jurisdictional error · not applicable

Statutory interpretation

1
Statute
Section 7 of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 826, c. 517), as amended by the act of February 18, 1895 (28 Stat. 666, c. 96)
Question
Whether appeal from interlocutory decree granting injunction must be taken within 30 days
Court's reading
The statute requires appeals from interlocutory decrees granting injunctions to be taken within 30 days from entry
Canons applied
plain meaning
no legislative history

Standards of review

  • Nature of decree (final vs. interlocutory) — de novo Court reviews legal question of whether decree is final or interlocutory de novo

Timeline

3
Events
258
Days, incident to ruling
—
Span
rulingcited in opinion

Circuit court entered decree finding trademark infringement, granting perpetual injunction, and referring case to master for accounting

Outcome: Decree for plaintiff

This decree is the subject of the appeal and the court must determine whether it is final or interlocutory

Timeliness of appeal
Circuit Court · Royal Baking-Powder Company · George E. Raymond Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois trial court
appeal eventcited in opinion

Appellant perfected appeal to Circuit Court of Appeals

Outcome: Appeal filed

Appeal was taken more than 30 days after January 21 decree, raising timeliness issue

Timeliness of appeal
George E. Raymond · Circuit Court of Appeals appellate court
rulingcited in opinion

Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed appeal as untimely

Outcome: Appeal dismissed

Final disposition of the appeal

Timeliness of appeal
Circuit Court of Appeals · WOODS · JENKINS Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit appellate court

Facts & evidence

Key facts

5 facts
  1. Royal Baking-Powder Company sued George E. Raymond for trademark infringement
  2. Company sought to restrain use of word 'Royal' for baking powder
  3. Circuit court found infringement and granted perpetual injunction
  4. Court referred case to master for accounting of profits and damages
  5. Appeal was taken while accounting was pending before master

Procedural history

5 steps
  1. Bill filed in circuit court
  2. Hearing on bill, answer, and proofs
  3. Decree entered January 21, 1896
  4. Appeal perfected June 17, 1896
  5. Motion to dismiss appeal filed

Evidence in the record

Documentary
  • Bill filed by Royal Baking-Powder Company
  • Answer filed by George E. Raymond
  • Proofs submitted at hearing

Objects of relevance

Baking powder product

Authorities

Cited authorities (8)

Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 3
followedprecedent
Cited as authority on final vs. interlocutory decrees
Bank v. Sheffey, 140 U. S. 445
followedprecedent
Cited as authority on final vs. interlocutory decrees
Iron Co. v. Martin, 132 U. S. 91
followedprecedent
Cited as authority on final vs. interlocutory decrees
McGourkey v. Railway Co., 146 U. S. 536
followedprecedent
Cited as authority on final vs. interlocutory decrees
Latta v. Kilbourn, 150 U. S. 524
appliedquotedprecedent
Cited for rule distinguishing final and interlocutory decrees based on whether reference to master is for ministerial or judicial purpose
states the settled rule to be 'that if the court made the decree fixing the rights and liabilities of the parties, and thereupon referred the case to a master for a ministerial purpose only, and no further proceedings in court were contemplated, the decree is final; but if it referred the case to him for a judicial purpose, as to state an account between the parties, upon which a farther decree is to be entered, the decree is not final'
David Bradley Manuf'g Co. v. Eagle Manuf'g Co., 18 U. S. App. 349
followedprecedent
Cited as authority on final vs. interlocutory decrees
Brush Electric Co. v. Western Electric Co., 76 Fed. 761
followedprecedent
Cited as authority on final vs. interlocutory decrees
Lockwood v. Wickes, 75 Fed. 118
followedprecedent
Cited as authority on final vs. interlocutory decrees

Statutes

  • Section 7 of the act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. 826, c. 517)
  • Act of February 18, 1895 (28 Stat. 666, c. 96)

Standards & doctrines

  • Final vs. interlocutory decree distinction for appeal purposes

Legal principles applied

  • Appeals from interlocutory decrees granting injunctions must be taken within 30 days under Section 7 of judiciary act
Index terms45
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Procedural terms
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Entities and documentation
Legal actions
Action type
dismissed
Target
appeal
Appealed from
Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois
Context
Appeal dismissed as untimely because it was taken from an interlocutory decree more than 30 days after entry
Scope
full
Disposition vote
unanimous
Search facets
Parties
Judges
JenkinsWoods
Courts
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